

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY,
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 2 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ZORIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGLIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. R. d'ORLANDI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. S.H. MCINTYRE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the twenty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Our debates last week should have taken us to the end of our immediate discussions on the preliminary part I of our joint draft treaty, and I hope that our co-Chairmen, refreshed by their May-Day holiday, will soon be able to present to us agreed language covering these initial articles.

We shall no doubt begin shortly the very important task of discussing comparable articles in stage I of each of the two drafts before us. Before we reach that stage I should like to venture a few general comments on the United States draft treaty (ENDC/20), because it will be recalled that the United States representative tabled his Government's important document at the twenty-third meeting of this Conference and when I spoke at that meeting I promised to study it closely and carefully and comment on it. I have now had the opportunity to give it the attention it deserves, and I should like to say that this has confirmed my view that it is indeed a most valuable contribution towards facilitating the further progress of our work.

I think the United States document is designed primarily -- and I suppose this is inevitable -- to meet the problem of United States and Soviet disarmament. In due course it will naturally be filled out to cover the way in which all militarily significant States, once they have been brought in, will share the obligations of general and complete disarmament. If I may say so, it gives the fullest guide ever placed before a disarmament conference on how we should set about the problem of attaining our goal of general and complete disarmament.

I say that deliberately, and I say it not only because it is abundantly true when one studies the detailed provisions of the document, but also because our Soviet colleagues have tended to make the point that even now it is only an outline, whereas they claim that their own document, submitted earlier, is a draft treaty. I do not want at this stage to criticize the submission of the Soviet document, because undoubtedly it has been a help to us and it should continue to be a help to us in our joint discussions; but a document does not become a treaty just by calling it one; it does not become even a draft treaty just by being called one. In fact, anyone who stops to consider for a moment the

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tremendous amount of detail that we here have got to work out and that will have to be written into the treaty emerging from our discussions round this table will recognize that, if the United States document is an outline of a treaty, then the Soviet document is a sketch for an outline for a treaty. Both documents, however, are useful for our deliberations, and my point is that it is really immaterial what we call them at this moment because --- and I would emphasize this particularly --- the draft treaty that emerges will not be a Soviet draft, it will not be a United States draft; it will be a draft of the nations taking part in this Conference.

Some of the important provisions of the United States document are clearly at this stage still in an illustrative form. I do not think this is a fault, and I do not think that it should cause any concern; indeed I personally welcome it as evidence of the honest and sincere approach that underlies the document. There is no take it or leave it attitude on the part of its sponsor; there is no attempt to disguise its nature where it is necessarily tentative; and there is no pretence that other delegations represented on this Committee could not help in improving it. Indeed, as an illustration of this, our United States colleague, Mr. Dean, made this clear in his statement of 25 April when he asked for suggestions as to how the concept of destructive capability might be applied to all categories of armaments.

I think one of the most realistic aspects of the United States document is that its drafters had clearly in mind the magnitude of the task that we are trying to accomplish. I think this is a point which all too often is overlooked and which rather tends to be pushed into the background by overstressing, for instance, the time-limit. Some idea of how long the disarmament process is going to take is clearly indispensable, for without it obligations to disarm would be meaningless. But is it truly realistic to set a superficially attractive and short time-limit before thinking just what in fact is involved? If one sits down to consider it, it really is difficult to picture in one's mind a disarmed peaceful world. We are used, and we have been used for as long as history can remember, to a turbulent world. And if we are to achieve a disarmed peaceful world --- and I do not suppose there is anyone sitting round this table who does not desire this above everything --- then we must prepare for it so that our aim is actually realized when we come to the end of the disarmament process.

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That is why the United States draft provides for a more gradual process with the aim that it should be all the more certain. It gives assurance, as far as is reasonable, that no one of evil intent anywhere in the world shall disturb the peace of his neighbours. The mere fact of signing a piece of paper with inadequate preparation is not going to destroy ill feelings and old scores overnight. Therefore, those who may complain that the draft does not do enough fast enough tend to overlook the fact that it is preparing surely for really effective, lasting peace.

Let me now take up some of the highlights as I see them in the United States document. It would clearly be impossible to pick out all the provisions in the document which my delegation finds important -- indeed, I have already said how valuable I find the whole document. But it puzzles my delegation why the communist representatives have paid so little regard to United States proposals for the cessation of the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and for the attendant transfer to non-military purposes of an agreed quantity of fissile material from past production. I was surprised also to see what Mr. Gromyko, in his Moscow speech, said in relation to the proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should each contribute fifty tons of fissile material to a stockpile which would be controlled. He said:

"Some credulous people may at first think that this proposal, though it does not lead directly to disarmament, at least comes somewhere close to it. In fact, it has nothing in common with disarmament.

For it is well known that States have now accumulated so large a quantity of fissionable materials that many, many nuclear bombs and charges can be manufactured from these materials even if their quantity is somewhat reduced." (ENDC/34, page 11)

My reading of this statement by Mr. Gromyko leads me to understand that he is not disagreeing with the idea of a cut-off of production of fissionable material and the depositing of a certain quantity. His argument seems to be that the quantity proposed by the United States to be deposited on either side is not nearly enough to be effective. That is the meaning of his words. He is not arguing against it in principle; he is saying that this proposed reduction is not nearly enough. If that is the Soviet position -- and I hope I have interpreted it

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correctly -- then surely the Soviet Union can put forward a proposal of its own as to the quantity of fissionable material which it thinks could properly be put on one side as a definite measure in an early stage of the disarmament process to reduce the nuclear capability on both sides.

I want to be absolutely fair about this. If, in fact, Mr. Gromyko thinks the quantity is not enough, then let him state one. But, again, if he thinks that it is unfair that both sides should put aside the same quantity, then let our Soviet colleague here tell us what quantity each side should put under control to be fair to both sides. I stress this because one of the attractions to me of this proposal is that it would be one of the easiest measures for which to provide verification without involving the hazards which our Soviet colleagues seem to fear in some respects and to which I shall return later in my speech.

Now I come to the proposal in the United States plan for a reduction of 30 per cent in all armaments right across the board in stage I. Here the United States delegation tried to spell out in their draft in a good deal of detail just what this proposal would involve. I am sure that all my colleagues must agree with me that this is much more specific than the proposals in the Soviet draft and, when we come to this very important part of our discussion in relation to stage I measures, I am sure we shall all welcome the support of our Soviet colleagues in seeking to set out precisely what is involved in reductions of armaments in their first stage. Members of the Committee will be aware that the Soviet draft at present before us merely states that all conventional arms released during the reduction of United States and Soviet forces to 1.7 million men will be destroyed. Of course, we shall need something far more precise than that, and no doubt our Soviet colleagues can help us in this regard.

It is true that in the Soviet plan provision is made for the total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, whereas the United States plan envisages only a 30 per cent reduction. But, when one considers all that is involved and all that is implicit in the abolition of nuclear delivery vehicles, I would have thought that the United States plan is certainly far more realistic than its Soviet counterpart. We shall of course have to discuss these relative proposals for reductions of armaments in the first stage when we come to consider the relevant articles in both the United States and Soviet drafts. Therefore I do not propose to go into detail with regard to them now.

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As regards the United Kingdom, I would only say that we are determined to play our full part not only in the formulation of a treaty but also in carrying out the provisions of that treaty when it is agreed. We are considering how the proposals for reduction both of forces and of armaments would apply to our own forces, and we assume that the other nations sitting round this table are doing the same and will contribute their views at the appropriate time.

On the question of force levels, there is of course a difference between the United States proposal of 2.1 million for themselves and for the Soviet Union and the comparable Soviet proposal of 1.7 million. But of course these are matters which we shall have to thrash out in connexion with the related articles, and the difference between the United States and Soviet figures would not appear to me to be so great as to deter us from our task. I would only say here that in modern warfare it is the armaments that are decisive rather than the number of men, and of course men who have been disbanded can always be called up again whereas armaments that have been actually destroyed cannot so easily be replaced. It is noticeable that the United States plan puts the reduction of armaments first and then deals with the reduction in force levels; for, if armaments are thrown away, it is this that reduces the need for men to use them rather than the other way round.

Then there is the important question of the length of time for the first stage of disarmament. The United States proposal is for three years, while the Soviet proposal is for a much shorter period. Here I think we really have got to adopt a practical approach. Let us work out in detail what is involved in the actual reduction both of weapons and of manpower and of the agreed verification measures which will go with these processes; and then let us be realistic and agree the time that this could properly take. When one stops to envisage the very complicated measures that are going to be involved, even in this first stage of general and complete disarmament, it is obviously not a measure that can be compressed into a very short period of time; but let us agree the measures and then let us determine a realistic time in which they can be carried out. If it can be shown that this can be done effectively in a shorter period than the three years laid down in the United States plan, then I for one support it; but the time limit for this first stage, as for subsequent stages, must be one that is realistic in the light of the work that has to be done.

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I would approach in the same way the time limits for the second and third stages. By all means let us work out agreed time limits, but they must be related to the work to be carried out in those stages, and they must not be unrealistic targets established even before we have tried to work out what in fact will be involved in the physical process of disarmament.

In this context I think that the observations of Prime Minister Nehru of India on this subject are very apposite. Speaking at a press conference in New Delhi on 21 March, he said:

"Immediate total disarmament is physically not possible. You cannot have overnight huge changes, but the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union have all agreed on complete disarmament. It has to be by phases and it has also been agreed that each phase should be such that it does not give an advantage to either party."

I think those are very wise words.

As regards the importance of peacekeeping arrangements, it is an undoubted fact that as disarmament progresses this subject becomes increasingly one of greater importance. In the present world situation many nations, including the United Kingdom, maintain only the minimum forces necessary for their own security and for fulfilling their obligations to their allies. As the process of disarmament proceeds in accordance with our plans, reliable arrangements for keeping the peace and for reducing tension in the world become ever more essential.

In this connexion I was frankly surprised at what Mr. Zorin had to say in regard to the United States plan, but I was even more surprised at the attack -- and I must call it an attack -- which Mr. Gromyko made on my superior, Lord Home, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 24 April. Mr. Gromyko said on this occasion:

"Incidentally, when the Foreign Minister, Lord Home, was at Geneva, he talked a good deal about it being necessary to find ways of bringing the positions closer together and reducing the tension between East and West. But he no sooner got back to London than he made a speech in the House of Lords on the following day, and stated no more and no less than the following: 'Tension may be part of our human condition. It may be that it is a pre-condition of progress, and that without tension we would stagnate'.

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"The question arises which United Kingdom Minister ought we to believe -- the one who spoke in Geneva in favour of bringing the positions of the West and the East closer together and reducing tension, or the one who spoke in the House of Lords?" (ENDC/34, page 8)

I should like to make the point absolutely clear in the minds of representatives here by requoting the actual words that Mr. Gromyko quoted from Lord Home. They were these:

"Tension may be part of our human condition. It may be that it is a pre-condition of progress, and that without tension we would stagnate." That was the quotation Mr. Gromyko made, and it was quite clear what conclusion he was seeking to draw from that quotation.

Now my colleagues round this table will no doubt be interested -- I do not suppose that they are regular readers of the Hansard of the House of Lords -- to hear exactly the context in which those words were spoken. I shall now quote in full what Lord Home said:

"The Russians do not want war, but they want peace on Communist terms. They say that they want coexistence, but they want their own interpretation of coexistence. I suppose we must accept this tension, and, indeed, tension may be part of our human condition; it may be a pre-condition of progress, and that without tension we stagnate. But it is neither wise nor good when great nations artificially stimulate, for political or ideological reasons, tensions which are, in any case, natural to life. It is dangerous for those nations who promote the tension, because it can boomerang on themselves. It is possible -- and we have learnt this over the last few months -- to coexist and to co-operate".

As all my colleagues round this table must see very clearly, Lord Home was not, as Mr. Gromyko's partial quotation would suggest, justifying the creation of tension but, on the contrary, emphasizing its danger: and the tension to which he referred was that created by the Soviet version of "peaceful coexistence".

Here I must interpolate that it will be in the recollection of my colleagues round this table that not many meetings ago you yourself, Mr. Chairman, chose to comment on the ways of parliamentarians in regard to their quotations. You accused me at that time of having given only a limited quotation and, therefore, of not having given the full meaning. I think I was able to show later that the

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charge was unjustified, but, bearing in mind what you chose to say to me, I wonder if you would care to use the same remarks -- only a good deal more strongly -- to your own colleague, Mr. Gromyko; because here is a much more flagrant example, simply because in the context in which those words were used Mr. Gromyko, it seems to me, must have been seeking to distort their meaning to people who had no opportunity of seeing the whole text. It is wrong for anyone to misquote or to quote limited passages here in this Conference from our own statements, but at least when that is done it is customary to give the reference so that we can all check. On this occasion there was no such opportunity; and I shall be very interested to see what action you, Mr. Chairman, may think it proper to take to correct this wrong impression of what Lord Home said which was given by Mr. Gromyko.

Returning to my theme, I should have thought it was self-evident that as we proceed with the disarmament process we must all of us rely more and more for the effective maintenance of peace on an international body charged with that task. The United Nations is such a body, and it is the duty of all of us to see that it is provided with sufficient forces and equipment to enable it effectively to carry out its task.

There has been a certain amount of comment from various representatives round this table on the way in which such forces should be brought under the United Nations and which Articles of the Charter are most appropriate in relation to such an international body. Those are obviously matters of great importance; and when we come to the relevant articles in the two documents we shall want to discuss this fully and to decide on the most suitable basis on which forces shall be maintained for use by the United Nations; but, as to their need, this must be self-evident and it is therefore right and proper that it should be provided for.

Now I would like to come to the vital question of verification. This is a matter on which we have all known from the start that certain problems and difficulties were bound to arise. Why do I say this? I say it because when the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) were submitted to us at the United Nations last September there was one point on which agreement could not be recorded, and this was referred to in the records of correspondence between yourself, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. McCloy, which were circulated at the time. (A/4880, A/4881). Our Soviet colleagues said then that they were willing to accept all measures of verification necessary to

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check actual measures of disarmament, but that they were not prepared to accept verification of remaining forces, remaining armaments, or war potential. In other words, one could verify what was actually destroyed or disbanded, but nothing more.

The Soviet draft treaty -- and I want to be absolutely fair on this -- does seem to take us a little farther along this road, with references to verification of a proportionate part of production facilities when that same proportion of armaments has been destroyed. This no doubt would be useful, as far as it goes, but quite obviously it does not go far enough, in my submission.

Where there was to be a 100 per cent reduction of a particular category of armaments there would, I assume, under the Soviet plan be a corresponding degree of verification, though I am still not quite clear on this. In this context Mr. Burns referred on 24 April, in an impressive intervention, to the anomalous nature of the Soviet position. He asked (ENDC/PV.26, page 16) which of three possible alternatives was in fact the true Soviet position on verification. We shall all be grateful for a clear indication -- which, so far as I am aware, we have not yet received. However, for the purpose of this argument I am giving our Soviet colleagues the benefit of the most favourable interpretation, and I repeat, therefore, that I assume that in those circumstances they would accept 100 per cent verification.

Where there is to be reduction by a specified number or amount, again it should be possible to verify in accordance with the Soviet plan. However, where one reduces to an agreed number, as with the Soviet proposal to reduce to 1.7 million men, under the Soviet plan there is no provision for verification of this number. Furthermore, as the Soviet plan stands at the moment, the reduction of conventional armaments is linked to the reduction in the number of men. This, therefore, becomes all the more important.

The United States has said, with our full support, that this is not enough and that there must be some way of verifying that an undertaking to reduce to a specified number has in fact been carried out. This was made clear in the letter from Mr. McCloy to Mr. Zorin of last September, to which I have referred.

Furthermore, Mr. Gromyko has said in this Conference -- and it has more recently been repeated by yourself, Mr. Chairman -- that the Soviet Union will not trust the word of the West, nor does it expect others to take its word on trust.

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Therefore some way must be found to provide adequate assurance for both sides, while at the same time trying to take account of the fears -- exaggerated fears in my view, but nevertheless fears -- which the Soviet Union has expressed in regard to espionage. It has been known ever since the exchange of the Zorin-McCloy correspondence last September, and probably for much longer, that this particular difficulty existed.

It is now more than seven months since that correspondence was exchanged. We all assembled here in the middle of March to work for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the intervening months both sides obviously gave very considerable thought to the discussions that were to take place. Our Soviet colleagues obviously did so, since they tabled their draft of a proposed treaty right at the outset of our discussions. Therefore it is only logical to think, assuming that our Soviet colleagues are entirely sincere in their desire for general and complete disarmament, that they have given very active thought to the major points of difficulty; and outstanding among these, obviously, must have been this central vital question of inspection and verification.

I naturally hoped, therefore, when I came to this Conference that they would have some concrete proposals to put forward to solve the very difficulty which they themselves admit when they say in one breath that force levels must be fixed at a definite point and that they will not accept our word or expect us to accept theirs. If definite limits, either of armaments or of men, are to be established, and if we do not accept one another's word, clearly we must discover some form of verification which is not only acceptable to the West but tolerable to the Soviet Union, with its almost obsessive anxiety about espionage.

I was somewhat surprised, therefore, to find that our Soviet colleagues had brought forward no suggestion to solve this particular problem. On the other hand, the United States has in its plan produced this novel suggestion for zonal inspection. I described it, when referring to it briefly on 18 April, as an imaginative proposal. I went on to say:

"I hope it will be accepted; but if it is not accepted it is not sufficient merely to rest on those declarations that anything which seeks verification of agreed remaining war potential is espionage, because to rest on that is in fact to put the other representatives at this Conference in an impossible position.

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"We have got to find a way out of this difference. I think this suggestion is a worthwhile one, but if it is not accepted we must have some other proposal from our Eastern colleagues which really faces up to this problem." (ENDC/PV.23, page 40)

That was what I said on 18 April. I was therefore extremely surprised when both you yourself, Mr. Chairman, speaking here, and Mr. Gromyko, speaking to the Supreme Soviet, criticized this imaginative proposal most severely. Indeed Mr. Gromyko seems to have tried to distort it out of recognition. He appears to have said that there was no real significance for the Soviet Union in the fact that the scheme -- which he dubbed control over armaments, in other words international espionage -- would operate in one area of the Soviet Union at, say, the beginning of May and in another area at the end of that month. This, however, is not a fact: it is a fairy tale.

The fact is that the scheme would extend far more gradually and at a speed which would necessarily have to be agreeable to the States concerned. In the words of the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, paragraph G.3.c(3) --

"An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected" --
I repeat, progressively --

"by the international disarmament organization during stage I according to an agreed time schedule." (ENDC/30, page 14)

In paragraph G.3.c(5) we read:

"By the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of parties to the treaty." (ibid.)

Moreover, what justification can there possibly be for Mr. Gromyko's accusation of espionage, since it is the international disarmament organization -- the body which is to be set up in accordance with the proposals of the Soviet Union, as well as those of the United States -- which will be administering the zonal scheme if it is established?

It may be that this proposal is not a perfect solution, although, as I understand it, the plan is to relate the area of the territory of each State to be inspected to the total percentage of disarmament that is undertaken by that State at that particular period of time. This would seem to match up to the Soviet

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requirement that the degree of verification should not exceed the degree of disarmament, and in this regard I would have thought that it went a long way to meet the anxieties of the Soviet Union.

However, what really disturbs me most in regard to the Soviet reception of this proposal -- and I think I may be completely frank about this -- is that the Soviet Union has had, as I have pointed out, seven months in which to consider this vital point of difference, seven months in which to prepare to submit to this Conference a solution to this major problem. Yet not only has the Soviet Union submitted nothing whatever as a solution to meet a difficulty of its own creation, but apparently it is ready to reject out of hand, without any proper consideration, this valuable and constructive idea which has been brought forward in an effort to break the deadlock.

I am afraid that this attitude is just not good enough. If our Soviet colleagues really want general and complete disarmament, if they really want this Conference to succeed, then they should have been racking their brains to find a solution to this obvious major point of difference. Maybe I am wronging them; perhaps they have been doing this. If so, I hope they will give us the fruits of their thoughts in relation to it. But it is small encouragement to the rest of us when they not only bring nothing forward themselves but meet with contempt any suggestion put forward by others. This, I think, is an acid test of the sincerity of our Soviet colleagues. I say to them bluntly: "If you really want a treaty on general and complete disarmament, then face up to this problem and either produce realistic proposals of your own to deal with it or else at least show interest in these constructive proposals which have been brought forward by others." I do most sincerely beg of our Soviet colleagues to give some further thought to this, for I must say that my confidence in their will to achieve general and complete disarmament is much shaken by their attitude on this vital question of verification as displayed during the last week or two.

This brings me to say a few words about our negotiations in general. We have been here some weeks now and we have made some, although very limited, progress. We have almost agreed the wording of our preamble. We have committed to our co-Chairmen the task of attempting to draw up agreed wording for the general preliminary articles of our treaty, following on the discussions we have had on the matters to be contained in them. I hope they will soon be able to succeed in submitting agreed texts of these to us.

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We have had a number of general debates on the two draft plans before us, and these debates should help us all to understand the different viewpoints of our respective delegations. We should now be shortly entering on the more detailed discussion of the substantive articles for the first stage measures of disarmament. We have therefore reached a very important point in our work.

It is thus perhaps worth while to consider for a moment the procedures we have adopted, and to ask ourselves whether things are working as smoothly and as quickly as they should be or whether there is anything we can or should do to improve them. I apologize for detaining my colleagues by speaking at such length, but this is rather important and I want to put it before them.

The first thing that strikes me on this is that, as we reach these more detailed articles, we must try to engage in more real and effective negotiation -- using the word in its real sense. I feel that we are too busy making set speeches at one another -- I am acutely aware that that is exactly what I am busy doing at this moment --; but we make these set speeches at one another and then tend to leave the two co-Chairmen to try to negotiate an agreed position afterwards. This pattern may be right when we are dealing with generalities, but is it really the best way to proceed as we reach the more detailed matters?

If we are to succeed in our endeavours, there has got to be a great deal of real negotiation involving give-and-take on both sides. It may be that by making set speeches all the time we tend to harden our attitudes through public declaration of them, when if we had more informal discussion we might reach compromises more readily. In this context I agree very much with these remarks which Mr. Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence for India, made at our third meeting on Friday, 16 March:

"Our proposal, therefore, is that, at a pre-sub-committee stage, we should have informal meetings of all delegations in this room in addition to such talks, bilateral or trilateral, as may take place." (ENDC/PV.3, page 22)

He went on a little later to say:

"Now there would not be any use at informal meetings to make the speeches that have been made for so many years. But we could ask for points of clarification on this, that or the other question, questions such as the elimination of carriers; we could ascertain the objections, and so forth." (ibid., page 23)

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And he went on to develop this point.

Now, we did have one or two such meetings in the very early stages. I personally would welcome a return to them. Moreover, I myself have on many occasions proposed the setting up of sub-committees, thinking that we could get more informal discussion in such a body. Only the other day, 19 April, our Indian colleague, Mr. Lall, said in regard to our nuclear tests Sub-Committee:

"Ask any or all of us to join you if you think we could help."

(ENDC/PV.24, page 26)

Arising from that invitation, a suggestion was made by our United States colleague that some or all of the uncommitted countries be added to our discussions in the only sub-committee we have set up, namely the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests. But, for reasons best known to itself, the Soviet Union has adamantly opposed any such demands to make our meetings less formal or to set up these bodies which could discuss matters in a more relaxed atmosphere. I hope they will think again about all this, for I am convinced that our deliberations could be carried forward if we were to become more flexible in our procedural arrangements. We are not here merely to make speeches for the record: we are here to negotiate, and that is what I want to do.

Perhaps we could all give some further thought to this. I do not suggest that we should do away altogether with formal meetings, but if, for instance, we set aside two mornings a week for meetings, not in plenary, but informally, either together or in groups, to discuss some of the matters that confront us, we might find ourselves able to make better progress in real negotiations.

I put forward this suggestion for consideration, and I do appeal in particular to our Soviet colleague to give it thought. I have to speak frankly here: I have formed the impression more and more in listening to our Soviet colleague recently that he is becoming more interested in propagandist declarations and less in real negotiation. He does indeed seem more and more to have gone out of his way to find points of difference. Let anyone who doubts my word refer again to Mr. Zorin's statement on Tuesday of last week (ENDC/PV.26) when he was at great pains to find all the difficulties he could in the United States draft plan, and again to his final statement last Friday (ENDC/PV.28), which is fresh in the memory of us all, when in fact he told us that we -- all the other nations members of this Conference -- could discuss in the Committee of the Whole only such subjects and in such order as he chose.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Zorin may say that I am being unfair to him in making this comment. He may say that he wants to discuss only those things on which he says there is a prospect of agreement. But how does he interpret this? He interprets this as things that he likes but others do not. On the other hand, he refuses to discuss those things in which others are interested but which he himself finds difficult. Now if our discussions are to succeed, as I most earnestly hope they will, then both sides must be willing to discuss matters which they find difficult. After all, this is what negotiation means.

I feel entitled to say this because I myself, as I think my colleagues well know, have sought repeatedly to find areas of agreement and to find compromises where full agreement is not possible. I think it is valuable that we should record agreement wherever it exists, but we all know that there are areas where agreement does not exist, and that is precisely why we are here. If there had been full agreement in advance, then our presence round this Conference table would not have been necessary. We are here not only to record agreement on those things on which we are agreed, but to discuss and to evaluate those matters on which we are not agreed, and to find means by genuine compromise -- compromise which means that all of us may have to give way on some points -- to achieve agreement on the whole.

I apologize if I have spoken at length this morning, but I have been thinking deeply during these last few days about how our work is proceeding, and I am most anxious, as I am sure we all are, to see it proceed successfully. I hope my colleagues will do me the honour of giving some thought to the suggestions I have put forward.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The statement by the United Kingdom representative which we have heard this morning marks - I hope and believe - a turning point for our Conference. I say that because it seems to me that Mr. Godber has shown us the right road for the Conference to follow in order to complete the first part of its task in a positive manner. First of all, the United Kingdom representative made a detailed comparative study of the Soviet and the United States proposals and emphasized that it is from such a study, but one in which we all take part, that the agreement we all have in mind must derive. His exact words, I think, were:

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"..... the draft treaty that emerges will not be a Soviet draft, it will not be a United States draft; it will be a draft of the nations taking part in this Conference." (supra, page 6)

He could not have put it better, and for our part we are willing, as I am sure all the other delegations are willing, to co-operate in all objectivity and honesty.

The United Kingdom representative touched on nearly all the essential problems confronting us, bringing out the constructive and realistic nature of the United States proposals, and putting concrete and precise questions to the Soviet delegation on several points on which its position does not seem clear.

For my part, while endorsing those general comments, I should like to examine two basic questions - control, and measures for the maintenance of peace - on which the United States draft puts forward very clear, detailed and satisfactory proposals.

I shall try, first, to present my views on control objectively, without any preconceived ideas, and, of course, taking the texts submitted to us into consideration.

Mr. Zorin has told us:

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word. The Soviet Government is in favour of the strictest and most effective international control over disarmament measures." (ENDC/PV.21, page 27).

I could not agree with him more.

So let us see what, in theory - I stress "in theory" - would be the characteristics of a control system conforming to the foregoing principles. For this purpose, all possible disarmament measures could be divided into three classes:

- (1) Total measures: the total elimination of certain armaments; the total cessation of production of certain armaments; the cessation of production of all armaments; the disbanding of all armed forces;
- (2) Partial measures which involve the reduction of armaments to certain levels or reduction by certain percentages;
- (3) Partial measures which involve the reduction of armaments by certain fixed quantities.

Control should, in theory, satisfy the following requirements for the different classes: For disarmament measures in class (1), that is to say total measures, the total elimination of armaments or the total cessation of production would have to be

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verified by appropriate operations. It would also be necessary to make sure that on completion of the elimination measures, not a single weapon of a type covered by the measure in question remained in the State undergoing control.

For disarmament measures in class (2), that is to say reduction by a percentage or reduction to a fixed level, it would be necessary to verify by appropriate measures the destruction of what was to be destroyed, and how much remained in all the territory of the State undergoing control. For it is perfectly obvious that, in order to determine whether a certain percentage of armaments has been destroyed, the quantity remaining must also be verified. The very word "percentage" entails a reference to the whole, of which the percentage is a part. The same reasoning applies to measures establishing armament levels.

For disarmament measures in class (3) the problem is rather simpler, because it would be sufficient to verify the elimination of the agreed quantity, and that is why certain disarmament measures, such as the transfer of certain quantities of military fissionable material to peaceful uses, are the most practicable and could be put into effect immediately. These measures are also relatively easy to verify.

In each of the three cases I have referred to, it would thus be essential to verify, permanently and continuously, that none of the objects covered by the disarmament measure was produced again or re-embodied in the military potential of the State undergoing control.

It would thus be necessary for each party to be in a position to know whether the other party was continuing to fulfil the obligation after the initial stage, and fulfilling it completely throughout its territory. It follows that to control each disarmament measure, except perhaps those in class (3), the control bodies would need the most complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of the State undergoing control, and the fullest facilities for inspection all over that territory. That, in theory, is what would have to be done to provide entirely reliable control affording full guarantees.

I will say at once that we are not in favour of so extensive a system of control from the outset, even though it is theoretically advisable, because we recognize that it is not feasible and that to ask for it would be tantamount to not wanting disarmament. We are, on the contrary, in favour of control that is strictly proportionate to the disarmament measures adopted. That is why we consider the

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control system proposed in the American draft to be entirely suited to our aims. I am aware that this system entails certain risks, and it was precisely in order to draw attention to those risks that I took the time to explain how control should be carried out in theory. But all forms of disarmament always involve risks.

In his speech to the Conference on 16 March, Mr. Segni emphasized that courage was needed to overcome the obstacle of mutual distrust, and we, for our part, are prepared to show that courage if it can lead to an agreement. The armaments race itself is fraught with such deadly dangers that in order to stop it we are willing to face other dangers, provided they are reasonable and consistent with our aims. We are willing to go as far as possible in this direction and to examine and explore together every possible solution consistent with the overriding requirements of our people's security; it was with these considerations in mind that the United States proposal was drawn up.

Again, it is obvious that a system of control confined to verifying the quantities of armaments eliminated, without regard to the quantities remaining or to possibilities of new production, would not increase our security, but only reduce it and expose us to quite unacceptable risks.

I should now like to say a few words on the question of preserving peace after disarmament. I seem to have noted some very serious reservations on the part of the Soviet delegation concerning the organization of a United Nations Peace Force, as proposed in the American draft. I know that at first the Soviet delegation was entirely opposed to the very idea of an international police force, which in fact was not even mentioned in the Soviet draft of 19 September 1959 on general and complete disarmament. (A/4219). I see that unfortunately the Soviet delegation still maintains a negative attitude on this point. For our part we consider, as we did during the Ten Nation Conference of 1960, and always shall, that the strengthening of the United Nations by the formation of some international police contingents is essential. We do not share the view of the Soviet delegation that the danger of new acts of aggression will disappear with the destruction of the means of waging war. Even if all arms are eliminated, a larger and economically stronger country will always be able to oppress a smaller or poorer country if, in the disarmed world, we do not establish the rule of international law with adequate means of preventing or punishing any unjust act.

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In our opinion, that is an essential feature of the world we wish to create - a peaceful, disarmed world in which all countries, great and small, will live in freedom without fear. We were accordingly glad to find in the United States proposals the essential foundations for a system such as we desire. It is early yet to go more deeply into this problem, but it will have to be studied parallel to the formulation of disarmament measures, for the two problems must, in our opinion, be dealt with simultaneously and on parallel lines, by seeking solutions which are acceptable to all and which, above all, will safeguard the countries most exposed to aggression and subversion.

Before concluding, I wish to add a word about our method of work. Since the beginning of the Conference the Italian delegation has been asking that, in order to accomplish fruitful work, sub-committees should be set up to deal simultaneously with the various problems before us, with a view to achieving positive results simultaneously. I have quoted the words spoken by Mr. Segni in his statement of 16 March (ENDC/PV.3, page 13).

My delegation has also proposed on several occasions that we should continue the system adopted at the outset on the proposal of the Indian delegation: that of restricted meetings without records. My delegation asked, in particular, that this system should be applied to the specific problem of organizing international control over nuclear tests that would exclude any possibility of espionage. It is for these reasons that I fully agree with what Mr. Godber said this morning, and I hope that, in accordance with his suggestion, the Conference will be able to resume these private meetings at which it is much easier to reach agreement. I have the impression that the Soviet delegation has various objections to such meetings; I do not know why, but I am sure that with an effort to show goodwill, Mr. Zorin will also recognize the advantage of this method of work, and comply with the wish expressed by several delegations.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with great interest to the statements we have heard this morning by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy. I think they were exceptionally helpful and will certainly assist us to make progress in our work.

This morning I would like to continue my remarks on the portion of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30) dealing with the reduction of armaments in stage I by explaining the way in which the United States proposal relates the

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problem of the reduction of armaments to the problem of control. I would like to explain the United States position on an important part of its proposal. I think this is timely because the two co-Chairmen are scheduled to begin their deliberations this afternoon on initial provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft proposal (ENDC/2) contains certain provisions setting forth in rather general terms the obligation of the parties to submit to measures of international control. I think it is appropriate that at the time we are discussing the control obligations we should have before us some idea of the substantive measures to which these control obligations are to be applied.

The measures with which we are dealing in article A of the United States draft, concerned with the reduction of arms, involve:

1. a reduction of armaments during stage I equal to 30 per cent of the inventories at an agreed base date; and

2. a limitation on the production of armaments to agreed allowances.

These measures must, of course, be under strict and effective control which will, as stated in paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles:

"... provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."

(ENDC/5, page 2)

This means that the control obligation must provide the parties to the treaty with the assurance that:

(i) the armaments to be reduced are in fact reduced so that they are not reclaimable as armaments;

(ii) the inventory of arms on which the 30 per cent reduction is calculated is in fact an accurate inventory of armaments; and

(iii) the agreed production allowance is not in fact exceeded, either by production at declared plants or using clandestine production facilities.

From some of the statements by my Soviet colleagues that we have heard in the past week, I should think my colleagues at this Conference would be justified in assuming that under the United States proposed treaty the United States would insist that every square inch of the Soviet Union be inspected before even the first cannon was destroyed. If any of my colleagues here have this impression, I would like to dispel it. I would like to do this by calling attention to paragraph 2 of article A of the United States draft (ENDC/30, pages 5 and 6). I would also like to call

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attention to the United States proposals on control which are found in article G, particularly paragraph 3 of that article (ENDC/30, pages 13 and 14). This particular paragraph sets forth as an illustration which we should discuss at this Conference the concept of progressive zonal inspections. Let me discuss in a little more detail just how this concept might work as applied to the United States programme for the reduction of armaments.

It will be observed that sub-paragraph a of paragraph 2 of article A (ENDC/30, page 5) provides that the parties to the treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the international disarmament organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed base date. This declaration should be by numbers, and, if destructive capability were thought to be an acceptable control criterion, we should use this as well.

Now I note here with concern the thought that has been expressed by some of my colleagues that States might not be willing to make any declarations of this kind. I say I note this with concern, because, if this is indeed true, if in fact there will be reluctance even to make a declaration concerning armaments, either by numbers or by total destructive capacity, our hopes for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world will suffer a severe setback. A declaration of armaments is merely a first step; much more than that will be required before we have completed our progress towards general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world; much more will be required before we can be assured that we are all travelling in the same direction and at the same rate.

However, the declaration is the first step, and under the United States proposal it would be on the basis of these declarations that the size of the reductions would be computed. I would note that both the United States and the Soviet proposals start with this concept of declarations. This concept is expressly incorporated in paragraph 5 of article 2 of the Soviet draft, which provides that:

"The States parties to the treaty shall in good time submit to the international disarmament organization such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary to carry out the measures of the corresponding stage." (ENDC/2, page 4)

The United States and the Soviet drafts agree that at the beginning of the first stage of disarmament the first cuts should be made on the basis of declaration by the parties. The United States and the Soviet Union also agree that by the end of the

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third stage the international disarmament organization should have complete access to all the territory of the parties in order to ensure that the parties are complying with their obligations under the treaty. The United States proposal is found in article G (ENDC/30, page 33). The Soviet proposal is found in article 38 (ENDG/2, page 24). Where, then, do the proposals differ?

The difference between the United States draft and the Soviet draft is that the United States does not rely on the declaration alone for verifying the amount of armaments that must be destroyed -- and hence the amount to be retained -- during the various steps of the first stage and on through the second and third stages. The proposal of the United States provides for verification of the retained levels by means which, I submit, are consistent with the statement in paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles that:

"... the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage."

(ENDC/5, page 2)

I have already observed that the United States has restated this principle in its proposal in the following way:

"... the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations." (ENDC/30, page 13)

Under the United States proposal (ENDC/30, page 33) the obligation to disarm begins immediately with the coming into force of the treaty. During the first six months of the treaty the parties are required to effect a 10 per cent reduction in armaments and to place them in depots under the supervision of the international disarmament organization. They are to be destroyed, or converted to peaceful uses, during the second six months of the year. This process is to be completed during the second and third years of stage I.

A similar process is to be carried out during stage II and stage III.

Sub-paragraph d of paragraph 2 of article A provides that:

"In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a treaty annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels." (ENDC/30, page 6)

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This provision does not mean that the United States would insist that every square inch of the Soviet Union be inspected for basic armaments levels or for clandestine production facilities before the first armaments were destroyed or the first production facilities curtailed.

Quite the contrary is true. Under the United States proposal the first reduction of 10 per cent which I have described will have to be computed upon the basis of a declaration by the parties themselves which will have been subjected to little, if any, verification.

If a system of progressive zonal inspection similar to that which the United States has suggested as an illustration was adopted, then some time during the first year, perhaps at the same time as the first reduction in armaments was being made, the international disarmament organization would actually be inspecting for armaments, not in all of the territory of the parties to the treaty, but in only a relatively small portion of the territory, consisting of one or more of a selected number of zones. The results of this inspection would then be compared with the declarations made by the parties themselves, not only as to their total armaments facilities but also as to the amounts of armaments located in the various zones. If the results of the declaration coincided with the results of the inspection, there would naturally be an increase in confidence in the declarations in the other zones.

I cannot, of course, accurately predict a precise mathematical relationship which might exist between the percentage of the reduction and the percentage of the territory subject to inspection of the zone. But it is clear that they would be roughly equivalent. I am speaking, of course, of the reduction in the various steps in the stages. If there were to be another agreement upon the reduction of, let us say, fissionable materials, then of course other work might go on with respect to the verification of the reduction of such fissionable material.

But it is clear, I submit, that as the reduction under the treaty was taking place, there would be a progressive increase in confidence as the progressive zonal inspections showed the actual armaments facilities to coincide with the amounts of armaments facilities declared to be within the particular zones.

The United States has indicated its belief that, if such a proposal were adopted, inspection would have to be extended to all parts of the territory of the

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parties to the treaty by the end of stage III, but in this the United States proposal differs only in degree from the proposal of the Soviet Union which envisages similar rights of access beginning after the completion of stage III instead of by the end of stage III.

In the case of limitations or prohibitions of production, the system of progressive zonal disarmament would operate in more or less the same way. Initially the limitations or prohibitions would be on the basis of declared plants and those plants would be subject to inspection wherever they were located. There would be no general right to inspect the territory of the parties for clandestine plants. Reliance would have to be placed upon the progressive zonal system to verify that no secret plants existed.

In putting forth this suggestion of progressive zonal inspection, and in showing how it would relate to the reduction of armaments, the United States has tried to suggest one method by which the extent of inspection and the extent of disarmament could proceed hand in hand. The United States does not insist on this method and is prepared to discuss any other, provided it lives up to the criterion that the extent of the inspection during any stage or step would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violation.

I should like to return just for a moment to the observation made on 25 April by the representative of India (ENDC/PV.27, page 15), where he posed what appeared to be a dilemma growing out of the possible use of destructive capability as a criterion in the first two categories of weapons. He felt then either that the range of weapons as to which this criterion was to be applied would have to be so small as to make the concept meaningless, or that we would require the parties to declare the destructive capability of their weapons to a greater extent than they would be prepared to do.

I have the greatest respect for the representative of India, and therefore I have given this matter a great deal of study. But I submit that this will not be the case. This follows from the reduction of armaments by types within categories and is indeed, we believe, one of the principal virtues of this method of reduction.

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If the initial reduction is to be computed by types within categories, I would assume that it will be possible, within the limits of human fallibility which will naturally affect all our efforts, to work out a definition of types within categories so that the destructive capacity of each individual item in a type is identical, or close to it. From this it follows that if you reduce a percentage of each type in a category you also reduce the destructive capability in that category by an equal amount. Then the measure of destructive capacity becomes important only if a party to the treaty is continuing to produce in stage I a particular type of armament and decides to offset it with destruction of additional armaments over and above the required 30 per cent reduction in stage I so that the net 30 per cent reduction will be maintained in the respective categories.

I submit that disclosure of the destructive capability of the armament will not be a problem. The armament to be destroyed will be destroyed under the supervision of the international disarmament organization and there should be no difficulty about that organization inspecting it. The same will be true of the offsetting items to be produced in stage I. There may well be difficulties in agreeing to the proper definition of destructive capacity and it is for this reason that the United States suggested that this should be a criterion only in the first two categories. But if any definition can be agreed to without unduly protracting these negotiations in the other eight categories, the application of these definitions in the context of production and replacement will not present a serious problem, since both the armaments to be produced and those to be destroyed in lieu thereof will be produced and destroyed respectively under the watchful eyes of the international disarmament organization.

I would like to go one step further, and answer the question put by the representative of India whether perhaps one way out of the dilemma would be to stop production entirely except for replacement parts. I believe that the suggestion was made at our twenty-seventh meeting (ibid.) that this might be done at the end of stage I. In my statement at that meeting I gave the reasons why the United States felt that it was not feasible to ask States to stop production at the beginning of stage I and I stated that we were prepared to do so at the beginning of stage II. I hope that the representative of India will bear with us

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on the difference between the end of stage I and the beginning of stage II, for at the beginning of stage II we will have made substantial progress in reducing the arms race not only by a reduction of 30 per cent in numbers and in the destructive capacity of armaments, but also by dismantling, at the beginning of stage II, the industrial plant which lies behind it.

When I made my statement on the significance in the United States proposal of the reduction by types within categories as well as by categories, I stated in effect that it is just not clear what the Soviet proposal envisages with respect to the differences between types and categories. Later on during the twenty-seventh meeting the Soviet representative took rather vigorous exception to this observation. He stated that the provision of the Soviet draft that released conventional armaments and armaments intended for reserve forces should be destroyed would result in a very substantial reduction of armaments. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I would like to quote paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 11 of the Soviet proposal:

"2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

"3. All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed.

"All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities." (ENDC/2, page 10)

It may well be true, as Mr. Zorin stated in his intervention at the twenty-seventh meeting, that this will result in a very substantial reduction of armaments. It may well also be true that this will result in a reduction of armaments by types and that it is not the intention of the Soviet Union to assign

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to the disbanded units just the older and less efficient types, and hence destroy only this type of armaments. Although this may well be the Soviet intention, I submit that the Soviet draft treaty is not specific on this point. If the draft presented by the Soviet Union is indeed intended to represent a treaty commitment, in our view it must be made more explicit.

For example, we know that if a unit is disbanded completely its armaments are to be destroyed. But what happens if the unit is merely reduced in strength? Are its armaments reduced in proportion? And if a unit is not completely disbanded, are its armaments not reduced at all?

In article 11 of the Soviet draft, what are armaments "intended for reserve forces"? Intended by whom? Are they armaments representing a fair sample of the newest and latest types? And how does an inspector from the international disarmament organization establish the intent for which arms are retained?

It will be noted that paragraph 2 of article 11 of the Soviet draft provides that the reduction shall be carried out "primarily" through the demobilization of certain personnel. I submit that the word "primarily" is not a very precise treaty term. It will also be noted that paragraph 3 provides that armaments of the "disbanded units" should be destroyed.

Under the language of the Soviet proposal, a substantial amount of the reduction could be carried out by the destruction of armaments of lower destructive capability which were assigned to the disbanded units. It might be possible also not to disband certain units at all, but merely to meet the force level required by keeping the units in cadre form, but with all the armaments retained.

How, in short, does the representative of the Soviet Union propose to deal, in specific terms, with the fundamental problems of balance dealt with so carefully in the United States proposal to reduce by types within categories?

This is the kind of question which my delegation believes must be answered, and answered in considerable detail, if we are to determine whether the Soviet draft embodies the same intent as that embodied in the United States draft and, if not, what differences do exist.

This concludes my remarks on this particular point for today. I plan to continue in later meetings an exposition of the key features of the outline draft treaty which my delegation has tabled for consideration here.

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In conclusion, I would simply like to remind representatives again that you and I, Mr. Chairman, are meeting this afternoon to consider all the proposals which have so far been received on "Part I: Objectives and Principles" (ENDC/18), and that we plan also at our meeting to fix a meeting later this week --- tentatively suggested for Friday --- where we would go over all the drafts which have so far been submitted. I do believe that at various stages of our drafting it will probably advance the work of the Conference to set up sub-committees; but, again, speaking as one of the co-Chairmen, I am of course subject to the wishes of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I shall speak in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

Today we have heard statements by three delegations which touched on a whole number of questions concerning both the proposals which we are considering, and the methods of the future work of our Committee.

On the latter question, I think that the arguments put forward by these delegations make it advisable to think over the methods of our future work. In principle, there can be no objections to the arguments put forward by some delegations, concerning the possibility of considering certain questions not only at official plenary meetings of our Committee but also informally at private meetings, as we did at the start of our work and actually as we have been doing during the whole course of it. The only question that arises is upon what matters, and when, is it worth while holding such informal meetings? I think that in the course of our discussions, especially on the concrete plans submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States, we shall obviously find some questions, or rather parts, of this treaty and plan, on which, after official discussion of some important questions, it will be possible to arrange an informal discussion of those parts which may turn out to be controversial and on which an informal exchange of opinions is required.

The Soviet delegation does not exclude this possibility, and I think that we, as co-Chairmen, will give it further thought with a view to proposing to our Committee to take advantage of this possibility in our future work.

I shall say no more for the time being about the method of our future work. As regards the substance of the problems now under discussion, I believe that the Committee has virtually concluded consideration of the first three articles of the

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draft treaty which determine the general scope of the obligations of States in respect of measures of general and complete disarmament, as well as the general principles of control over their implementation and measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. As requested by the Committee, the co-Chairmen are at present endeavouring to agree the provisions of these articles and, as the United States representative has rightly stated, we shall make an attempt today after our meeting to move forward in solving this problem.

Thus there has opened up before us an opportunity of going forward and proceeding to the consideration of the articles and provisions of the first stage of the implementation of general and complete disarmament. As a matter of fact, today the United Kingdom and the United States representatives referred to this first stage and discussed it in part.

Article 4 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Government defines the tasks of the first stage of disarmament. We attach great importance to this article and are profoundly convinced that the treaty on which we are working must contain an article of this kind. What is the reason for this necessity?

The first three articles which I mentioned give a general picture of what will have to be carried out by the States which signed the treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, they do not reveal to the proper extent what will be carried out, or when and in what order. This must be spelt out in articles dealing with each stage of disarmament. In order to be able to work the stages of general and complete disarmament correctly and in accordance with the Agreed Principles, it is necessary first of all to agree on the content of each stage and on the tasks to be assigned to it. We note that the United States delegation appears to be in agreement with this, since in its document an attempt has been made to outline the tasks of the first stage. This leads us to suppose that there will not be any disputes about the need to include in the treaty an article defining the respective tasks of each of the three stages.

I now come to the question of substance: in what the task of the first stage should consist. If we refer to the discussion which has taken place up to the present, we find that in the course of it two basic points emerged fairly clearly. All agree, first, that at the very outset of general and complete disarmament

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such measures must be taken as would remove the threat of a nuclear attack and a nuclear war. I shall not avail myself of references to statements made by representatives in order to corroborate this conclusion. I think it is beyond dispute.

The other point is the need in the first stage, when general and complete disarmament is only beginning and when, consequently, States still have a considerable military potential, to combine disarmament measures in a particularly careful manner with measures to preclude a situation in which any State or group of States might gain military advantage. This applies not only to disarmament measures as such but also to control measures. Here I should like to draw attention to the instructive experience of all previous negotiations, which shows that in practice it is hardly possible to combine the interests of control and the interests of security, if the matter is reduced to narrowly limited disarmament, or in other words, to some reductions in the field of the most powerful types of armaments. We ought not to repeat the mistakes of the past, if we really wish to agree on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Government has taken all these points into account in its draft treaty and proposes in article 4 as the main tasks of the first stage the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases on alien territories, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from these territories, and a substantial reduction in the levels of armed forces, conventional armaments and their production and a corresponding reduction in military expenditures.

It is not difficult to perceive the deep meaning implied in the brief formula of the tasks of the first stage in our draft treaty: to remove the danger which since Hiroshima has been causing anxiety to the peoples of all countries - the danger of being attacked with nuclear weapons of mass destruction. This danger, judging by Mr. Dean's remarks, is also recognized by the United States delegation. At the meeting on 24 April Mr. Dean stated:

"... it is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any others, have created a new condition in the world so that general war could place our civilization, as we know it, in serious jeopardy."

(ENDC/PV.26, page 11)

(The Chairman, USSR)

Mr. Dean concluded that nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, more than any other devices, make necessary the reaching of agreement on general and complete disarmament. That is what the Soviet Government also proposes.

At the end of the first stage - that is, eighteen months after the beginning of disarmament - nuclear weapons, as a result of the complete elimination of the means of delivery, will in fact have ceased to be weapons. They will lie as a dead weight in the stockpiles, awaiting their inevitable fate - elimination in the second stage of disarmament.

During the first stage, foreign military bases in foreign territories will also be eliminated and troops will be stationed where they ought to be in peace time - within their own national boundaries. The numbers of these troops will be considerably reduced; in particular, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States will number not more than 1.7 million men respectively.

Such is the general idea of the basic measures envisaged for the first stage of general and complete disarmament in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union.

If we now turn to the corresponding part of the United States document, the first thing that strikes the eye is that the centre of gravity is transferred from disarmament measures to subordinate measures: the creation of an international disarmament organization or, more precisely, a control system and the implementation of security measures. In regard to disarmament itself the United States document, in contrast to the Soviet draft treaty which sets definite tasks, limits itself to a general sentence about reducing armed forces and armaments. However, a sentence of this kind in no way expresses the specific nature of the first stage, with which, judging by Mr. Dean's remarks on the danger created by nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, the United States delegation ought to agree. It does not give a clear orientation. This, as we are convinced after studying the United States document, is by no means accidental.

We propose effective disarmament measures; the United States wants to confine itself to half-measures - percentage reductions conditional on a system of detection and verification.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to eliminate and to destroy completely all means of delivering nuclear weapons in the first stage. The United States limits itself to a proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery,

(The Chairman, USSR)

extending over three years. I have already had the occasion to point out that neither a 30 per cent reduction nor any other percentage or partial reduction of the means of delivery can eliminate the possibility of a nuclear attack and a nuclear war. So long as States still have means of delivery, even if in reduced quantities, nuclear weapons will not be neutralized. At any moment they can be launched and used to carry out a nuclear attack. One cannot get away from this inexorable fact.

If we take a look at the moral and political aspects of this question, there are grounds for saying that a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the United States, not only will not tend to consolidate peace but, on the contrary, may even do it harm. It may create the false impression among people that the threat of a nuclear war is dwindling, whereas in reality this would not be so.

Thus there is a danger that the vigilance of the peoples against a nuclear war would be lulled, and this would play into the hands of those who are counting on a war. It is no good closing one's eyes: such people exist in a number of Western States, and they will not vanish overnight after the signing of a treaty on disarmament.

It seems that the United Kingdom representative also agrees on this, since he has said today that after the signing of a treaty a lot of things in the world will not change overnight; in particular, the people who are counting on a nuclear war will not disappear.

The Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage also ensures the solution of the problem of strict international control. The United States proposal for a percentage reduction of the means of delivery on the contrary, would, in our opinion, lead the problem of control into an impasse. It would throw doubt upon the possibility of any solution.

We consider it necessary to emphasize that, apart from considerations aimed at the speediest possible removal of the danger of a nuclear war, another motive which induced the Soviet Government to propose the complete elimination of the means of delivery in the first stage was its desire to create the most favourable conditions for an agreement on questions of control. We cannot be satisfied with fictitious control; we are in favour of effective control and intend to ensure it.

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A serious approach to the question of control necessitates taking into account the whole military and political situation and the relations existing among States: that is to say, whether there is the necessary degree of confidence among them or not. It is hardly necessary to say that in the course of carrying out control measures, information can be obtained regarding the military situation and the defence system of a State. In certain circumstances such information may be used against that State. Such a danger becomes particularly serious when the possibility of carrying out a nuclear attack is retained. From the numerous writings of United States generals and admirals who propagate the doctrine of nuclear war and "massed blows", we know the arguments about the brevity of a war of this kind and the tremendous importance which a first nuclear blow can have. From the statements made by the same circles we also know the importance they attach to the pin-pointing of bombing objectives.

Consequently, so long as the possibility of a nuclear attack remains - and the situation will remain such unless nuclear weapons are eliminated or neutralized - control may further, not disarmament, but the pin-pointing of bombing objectives. I am prepared to agree with Mr. Dean's remark that measures regarding nuclear delivery vehicles involve "probably the most sensitive aspects of military security" (ENDC/PV.26, page 13). If that is so, then you do not draw the necessary conclusions.

In return for consenting to reduce by 30 per cent the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the United States demands the establishment of comprehensive control actually in the first stage. Although Mr. Dean tried today to persuade us to the contrary, the United States document bears me out. Paragraph 2(d) of the United States document states:

"... the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels". (ENDC/20, para. 6)

What would this mean in practice? As a consequence of the demand which I have quoted from the United States document, it would be the duty of States not only to submit complete information about their means of delivery and the places where these are located, but also to open their territory to all kinds of investigations and to inspectors wishing to make sure of the accuracy and completeness of the information supplied, since they must provide assurance that retained

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armaments do not exceed agreed levels. Now if there is a wish to have doubts, there will be no difficulty in finding pretexts, especially when certain military intelligence tasks can be carried out in this way.

Where then, is any account taken of the most sensitive aspects of military security which, according to Mr. Dean, the means of delivery of nuclear weapons involve?

Truth compels me to point out that in the United States document everything is put together in such a way as to justify the United States demand for the widest and most thorough control. It introduces, for example, the concept of taking destructive capability into account when reducing the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Mr. Dean has said more about that today. But how is the accuracy of the information concerning the destructive capability of a missile to be ascertained? Should this be done, perhaps, by carrying out tests or having target practice, or arranging something like a shooting demonstration? There is no provision for this, apparently, in the United States document. But from the raising of the question of the balancing of destructive capability, it is obvious that there is a desire to take a look at the design of the missiles and at their warheads, and to study perhaps the blueprints and, for all I know, the technical details of their manufacture. Otherwise it would be difficult to determine the destructive capability of a missile.

But why should all this be necessary? If we seriously intend to disarm and to destroy armaments, there is no need whatsoever for the balancing of the destructive capability of missiles or to study what they are filled with. This can only be explained by the desire to collect information about armaments, which in plain language is called intelligence.

Now let us look at what the United States proposes in the field of production. Stage 1, section A, paragraph 3 of the United States document ENDC/30 allows States the right to continue producing the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and moreover, not just spare parts but the weapons in their entirety - missiles ready for action, aircraft, artillery and so forth.

At the meeting on 25 April Mr. Dean told us about this in some detail - such production of the means of delivery is provided for by the United States.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Let us imagine what the United States proposal may lead to. In military units, at missile launching sites, there would be missiles with nuclear warheads ready for launching, if not 100 per cent, then 70 per cent of their present number; at airfields and perhaps in the air there would be bombers carrying atomic bombs, and at ports and on the high seas there would be ships and submarines with nuclear missiles. New rockets and aircraft would come off the factory production lines, while ships and submarines would be launched. The armaments produced would be put into service and, in order not to exceed the set level, worn-out and obsolete military equipment would be eliminated.

How does this picture of the first stage of disarmament according to the United States plan differ from the present situation? In fact, it does not differ at all; the only difference is that the armaments race would be, as it were, regulated at a certain level, at the level of 70 per cent and the work of intelligence services and agencies would be greatly facilitated.

I would not be frank if I failed to express all the thoughts to which the United States document gives rise, especially since the United Kingdom representative appealed to us to be frank and to engage in a businesslike discussion of all the questions connected with the documents that have been submitted for our consideration. The impression is being created that the United States is prepared temporarily - and I stress the word "temporarily" - to reduce its military machinery by 30 per cent, and then only in respect of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, in order to gain an opportunity of carrying out thorough reconnaissance work in the territory of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States. This view is not due to over-suspiciousness, but is a fully-justified conclusion based on certain aspects of the United States plan.

In my statement of 24 April I drew attention to the provisions in the United States document, determining the conditions of the transition from the first to the second stage of disarmament. These conditions virtually mean that matters may never go beyond the first stage, since any permanent member of the control council has the legal possibility of blocking any further disarmament. Mr. Dean has been silent about the views I have expressed in this regard. This is not surprising, because he cannot refute them without abandoning the position of the United States document.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Let us now compare this fact with the other fact, namely that the United States proposals stipulate the retention of the industrialized base underlying the production of missiles, bombers and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Does this not look like making sure of the rear for further development of the military machinery, in the event of a temptation not to go beyond the first stage and to renounce the implementation of the second and third stage? In that case, further development of the military machinery could be carried out at a higher level. It is well known that the United States is far from being ahead in the field of missile construction, and in this connexion it would be able to count on obtaining the information in which it is interested by means of the extensive control which it proposes.

I will emphasize once again that I am not indulging in conjectures, but am basing my reasoning on an analysis of the provisions laid down in the United States document. In fact, this can be found in the statements made by Mr. Dean at the meeting of 25 April. In expressing opposition to the dismantling of the industrialized base which underlies the production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, Mr. Dean stressed that the dismantling of these production facilities must be done gradually "as confidence in the workability of the disarmament process increases" (ENDC/PV.27, page 3).

As we see, the United States puts forward a new and, I would say, very alarming condition which can only confirm our fear that under the United States plan we shall in practice never reach the second and third stages of disarmament.

Arguments to the effect that it is also necessary to be assured of the "workability of the disarmament process" are extremely dangerous. We know beforehand that disarmament is certainly not to the liking of armament manufacturers.

At any rate Mr. Dean's explanations at the meeting of 25 April were useful - in the sense that they showed how shaky is the disarmament plan proposed by the United States. Against the background of these considerations it becomes clearer than ever that in the present circumstances and the present state of development of military equipment, the most practical way of facilitating progress towards general and complete disarmament is to provide for the complete elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets in the first stage.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government defines all the means of delivery which are to be eliminated and destroyed. Article 5 of the draft provides for the elimination of all rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and range, as well as pilotless aircraft of all types. Article 6 provides for the destruction of all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and article 7 for the elimination of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and of submarines, while article 8 provides for the elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons.

The indications, in articles 5-8 regarding the types of means of delivery of nuclear weapons are precise enough for the purposes of the treaty. We consider that there is no need to break down missiles, aircraft, etc., into categories and types according to their empty weight or range. For real disarmament this breakdown is unnecessary; what is necessary is the elimination of all means of delivery of any calibre, any range, any type or designation. Breakdown into categories is necessary for something else, namely for retaining the means of delivery and for their manufacture and thus for their permanent concomitant, the possibility of conducting nuclear war in the future.

Mr. Dean convinced us that this is so by his statement of 25 April. He said:

"This continued production" (i.e. production of means of delivery) "during the tapering-off process makes it necessary still to consider categories of armaments" (ENDC/PV.27, page 8)

At the previous meeting on 24 April, Mr. Dean reminded us that -

"negotiations which treat the various categories of armaments differently have usually bogged down in somewhat unprofitable wrangling in defining the categories because of concern on the part of a State affected the most by a cut in a particular category". (ENDC/PV.26, page 10)

In view of this statement by Mr. Dean, I was somewhat surprised at what was said this morning by Mr. Godber, who also spoke about special categories of armaments and wanted all this to be described in greater detail in our document.

But Mr. Dean was right about what happened in the past. Consideration of different categories of armaments usually reached an impasse. Is it not clear, after that, what the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons with a breakdown into various categories will lead to?

(The Chairman, USSR)

Mr. Dean's proposal with its long list of categories of armaments exudes very strongly a musty smell of the League of Nations. It is not difficult to check the result of the talks about categories of armaments and the balancing of their destructive capability. The library in this building, the shelves of which are filled with the records of the various League of Nations committees which drowned disarmament in such talks, provides abundant material on this subject.

In this connexion I agree with the remarks made by the Indian representative, Mr. Lall, who at our meeting of 25 April rightly recognized the fallacious aspects of the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons according to various categories while retaining the production of such weapons. Speaking about the United States proposal to take into account the various categories of armaments, Mr. Lall pointed out that:

"... at the very first stage of disarmament both sides would have to reveal all their destructive capability..." (ENDC/PV.27, page 15)

Mr. Lall then asked: "Is that realistic? Is that going to happen?" (ibid); and himself gave what, in our opinion, is the correct answer: "That, I think is unrealistic". (ibid) You are right, Mr. Lall. The United States proposal is unrealistic. It does not meet and cannot meet the requirements of disarmament, because it is essentially just another variant of the establishment of control over armaments. In this specific case it is the establishment of direct control over the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the industrial facilities that produce them. The peoples of the world do not need a control of this kind; they need genuine disarmament, and in the first place the removal of the danger of nuclear war. That is the aim of the proposal contained in the Soviet draft treaty for the complete elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage.

According to our plan, besides all means of delivery, all bases in foreign territories must be eliminated. The close co-ordination of these two measures is a necessary condition for compliance with the Agreed Principle that no State or group of States should gain military advantage in the process of implementing general and complete disarmament.

We have already explained, and are prepared to repeat once more, why the simultaneous elimination of means of delivery and of foreign military bases in alien territories is necessary. With the destruction of every strategic rocket

(The Chairman, USSR)

and every strategic bomber or ship capable of launching nuclear weapons, States which have no bases in foreign territories - in the first place the Soviet Union - would already during the first stage gradually lose their capacity to repel attacks from outside, whereas States possessing numerous military bases would remain capable of launching attacks from them.

This seems to me quite clear. The question of the difference between a foreign military base in alien territory and a national military base has already been touched upon in the Committee. A foreign military base in alien territory, equipped with the power and means of aggression, cannot be regarded otherwise than as a springboard for possible aggression.

No needs or considerations of defence can justify the stationing of rocket units and the basing of air forces, rocket-carrying submarines and other naval units tens of thousands of kilometres from the national frontiers of a State. The system of these measures is analogous to the moving of troops to the front line before starting military operations against an enemy. Everybody knows that.

In order to preclude such aggressive intentions from the very first steps of disarmament, and in order to place all the parties to the disarmament treaty on an equal footing throughout the disarmament process, the Soviet draft treaty provides in article 9 that:

"Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons ... the States parties to the Treaty, which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories, shall dismantle all such bases, both the principal and the reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any designation. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5 - 8 of the present Treaty, shall be destroyed on the spot".

(ENDC/2, pages 7 - 8)

The measures I have described cover to the fullest extent military bases used by foreign troops, even though in law these bases are at the disposal of the State in whose territory they are located. Why do we consider this necessary? Because, as a matter of fact and by reason of their practical consequences, such bases do not differ in any way from foreign military bases situated in alien territory which are under the complete control of the State which has secured them.

(The Chairman) USSR)

The measures I have mentioned for doing away with foreign military bases must also be carried out for bases created under military treaties and agreements for the purpose of their use by other States or groups of States, whether or not foreign troops are present at them at the time the disarmament treaty is concluded. It is hardly necessary to explain at length our reason for making this proposal. Bases of this kind are nothing else but previously-prepared bridgeheads for launching aggressive actions, whereas the first aim of a disarmament treaty is to preclude the possibility of aggression and to strike at its very roots.

It is not enough to abolish military bases in foreign territories in all their forms and appearances. Steps must be taken during the process of disarmament to ensure that they cannot be re-established. It is precisely for this reason that article 9 of our draft treaty provides for the abrogation of all previous treaty obligations and decisions of the organs of military blocs pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territory, and for prohibition of the placing of such bases at the disposal of foreign troops, and of the conclusion of treaties for this purpose in the future.

In Mr. Dean's statements concerning the United States plan for disarmament, we have heard repeated reference to paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles on disarmament, that is the principle of the equality of States in respect of security. But the United States position in regard to foreign military bases is distinctly at variance with this principle. While suggesting a percentage reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons - which, as has been pointed out often enough, does not remove the threat of nuclear aggression, but, on the contrary, may even increase it, since it provides an opportunity of ascertaining the most powerful means of defence - the United States for some reason or other relegates the dismantling of foreign military bases from the first stage to later stages. The very question of the dismantling of such bases is obscured by the fact that foreign military bases are put on an equal footing with national military bases.

The United States talks about the reduction of "agreed" bases in the second stage. But who can guarantee that with such an approach the matter will not boil down to a reduction only of national military bases, and that foreign military bases will not be left aside? Even during the second stage when, under the United States

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plan, the question of agreeing on the bases to be reduced arises, various kinds of objections may again be put forward against the dismantling of foreign bases, and States possessing such bases will refuse to reach agreement on this question.

The proposal contained in the United States document is not the way to real disarmament with due regard to the security of States, but a manifest attempt to ensure for the United States and the system of Western military blocs military advantages over the Soviet Union and other peaceloving States. But it is quite clear that there can be no agreement on that basis. Agreement can be achieved only on the basis of an honest, just and straightforward position. And this requires that the treaty we are drafting should provide that during the first stage, and in conjunction with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, foreign military bases in alien territories should also be eliminated.

We cannot get away from this. There can be no agreement on any other basis. No State which has no foreign military bases and which is threatened by foreign military bases can agree to any reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons unless foreign military bases are eliminated. This should be clear to everyone.

To finish with the question of foreign military bases, I should like to point out a striking discrepancy in the position of the United States. In its documents the United States persistently introduces the formula about disarmament "in a peaceful world". We have already dwelt on the political significance of this formula, and I shall not repeat what I have said. It is permissible, however, to ask how one can put forward such a formula and at the same time obscure the question of the dismantling of foreign military bases. Are foreign bases in alien territories an attribute of peaceful conditions throughout the world? No; foreign military bases in alien territories are incompatible with peaceful relations between States. If the presence of foreign military bases points to anything, it points to the undermining of peace throughout the world. Then be consistent in your proposals, Mr. Dean. If you really want to achieve peace throughout the world, you must agree to the elimination of that which is disturbing and undermining peace.

The natural concomitant of the elimination of foreign bases is the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from foreign territories. This measure is defined with precision by article 10 of our draft treaty. We have in view the withdrawal from foreign territories of the military units servicing the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the destruction of which is to be carried out in

(The Chairman, USSR)

accordance with articles 5-8, which I have dealt with earlier, and also the withdrawal of all military units and formations equipped with conventional armaments. All foreign civilians employed in such armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory must also be withdrawn. All these measures must be based on the abrogation of all treaty obligations that may have existed before the conclusion of the treaty on general and complete disarmament without conferring the right to send troops and military personnel to foreign territories in the future, and no agreements to this effect may be renewed.

The position of the United States on this question is similar to its position in regard to foreign military bases in alien territories. It is not based on the interests of balanced and equitable disarmament, but on the desire to gain military advantages. The United States Outline is completely silent on this question. I shall not dwell at present on the objections of the Western delegations to the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from alien territories, since the Soviet delegation has already proved the worthlessness of the argument that the withdrawal of foreign troops would create an advantage for the Soviet Union. I shall revert to this question in my next statement in connexion with our proposals regarding the reduction of the armed forces of States in the first stage.

Now I should like to conclude by touching on a question relating to nuclear weapons in connexion with the first stage of disarmament. At the meeting of 29 March, Mr. Dean posed the question:

"I would like to ask our Soviet colleagues why their treaty is so drafted as not to provide that measures for stopping the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes should be included in stage I." (ENDC/PV.11, page 11)

Mr. Dean showed his lack of understanding. But this lack of understanding surprises us, because Mr. Dean knows perfectly well the answer to that question. Here is what he himself said a little later, at our meeting of 24 April, on the cessation of production of fissionable materials:

"If the measure is one in which the parties agree to halt or limit production, the international disarmament organization must have access to the relevant production facilities and activities wherever located." (ENDC/PV.26, page 6)

This, in plain language, means the establishment of control over the atomic industry. But is this realistic, if at the same time there is no prohibition of nuclear weapons and no measures are carried out to eliminate and destroy them? Every sensible person knows that this is unrealistic.

(The Chairman, USSR)

If the United States agrees to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in the first stage, then the conditions will be created for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. But the Western Powers have invariably refused, and refuse even now, to agree to such a measure. In these circumstances the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes boils down to yet another form of control without disarmament or control over armaments. To that, of course, we cannot agree.

What I have said also answers the question why we consider it useless and even harmful to discuss the cessation of production of fissionable materials in the Committee of the Whole. I take this opportunity to answer the questions which were put today by the United Kingdom representative. An agreement on the question of fissionable materials, isolated from the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination, is impossible, and we are opposed to the work in the Committee being brought into an impasse, which is inevitable on that question.

With regard to measures relating to nuclear weapons, we have provided in our draft treaty for an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Something similar is contained in the United States plan. Incidentally, at our recent meetings there has cropped up in the statements of the United States representative the theme that precisely for this reason the question of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons should not be isolated and considered in the Committee of the Whole. It is impossible to agree with such an approach, if we are concerned to alleviate international tension and contribute to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Why did we include an article on prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in our draft? First of all, because after the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had put forward at the United Nations General Assembly the idea of general and complete disarmament, Ireland raised in the United Nations the question of adopting special measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We took this fact into account, as well as the support which Ireland's proposal met with among all the members of the United Nations. You know the evolution of the discussion of Ireland's proposal in the United Nations. Year by year it met with ever greater understanding, and significant in this regard is the last session of the General Assembly, the sixteenth, when it became quite clear

(The Chairman, USSR)

that there was a possibility of agreement on prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons even now, without waiting for agreement on the whole draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Logic itself is prompting us: why should we delay coming to a decision? Why should we leave open the opportunity to disseminate nuclear weapons, when we can raise a barrier against such a development here and now? Surely not in order that later on, when we come to the implementation of general and complete disarmament, we should be faced with more serious and complicated problems in the field of nuclear weapons, when they will have been disseminated among a greater number of countries.

One more remark. The adoption of measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons is a realistic matter. It is not linked at present with the establishment of control and the accompanying difficulties. I will say that the presence in the United States draft of provisions for preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, despite what Mr. Dean has said, does not make it more difficult but easier to reach agreement on this question. It merely stresses that there is the possibility of speedy agreement. The Soviet delegation considers that we should not miss this opportunity now, and that we should consider this question in the Committee of the Whole.

I have now explained the first articles relating to the first stage of disarmament, which are connected with the most important measures in that respect. At future meetings the Soviet delegation intends to give explanations of the articles concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments provided for in the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament set out in the draft treaty of the Soviet Union. We shall do that next time.

(Mr. LALL (India): We have heard four very important statements today. We would like to comment upon them. I merely wish to say that I hope we will continue discussion of this particular question tomorrow and will not switch to some other subject. I presume it is the intention of the co-Chairmen to give other members of the Committee an opportunity to make comments immediately following the statements which have been made today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-ninth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. V.A. Zorin, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States, the Soviet Union and India.

"In accordance with the agreement on procedural arrangements (ENDC/INF.1, paragraphs 3 and 4) adopted by the Conference on 14 March 1962, all documents and final verbatim records of the Conference distributed as at 15 April will be available to all Members of the United Nations and for public use on 4 May 1962, through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

